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I. INTRODUCTION
Like many other states,1 Washington provides criminal
defendants with the defense of diminished capacity.2 In brief,
this doctrine permits individuals charged with a criminal
offense to introduce evidence of mental illness or voluntary
intoxication to prove they did not act with the mental state
required for conviction. A defendant who successfully asserts
this defense could be either convicted of a lesser included
offense or acquitted outright. If acquitted of all charges, he
must be released unless the state seeks to have him civilly
committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act as mentally
ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled.'
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1. As of 1975, about 25 states had expressly or impliedly adopted some form of
diminished capacity defense. Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases forPurposes Other Than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1975)
[hereinafter Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases].
2. See infra notes 67-115 and accompanying discussion.
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010-71.05.930 (1987 and Supp. 1988). To commit him as
dangerous, the state would have to prove that the defendant was suffering from a
"mental disorder" and, as a result, "presents a likelihood of serious harm to others and
or to himself." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (1988).
'Likelihood of serious harm' means either: (a) A substantial risk that physical
harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his own person, as evidenced by
threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on one's self,
(b) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual
upon another, as evidenced by behavior which has caused such harm or which
places another person or persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm,
or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual
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Recently, Washington's diminished capacity bill has come
under fierce attack. During the last two sessions, the Washing-
ton legislature has considered several bills,4 sponsored by the
Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys ("WAPA"),
which would drastically revise this defense. Among other
things, some of these bills would make diminished capacity an
affirmative defense,5 preclude evidence of diminished capacity
when crimes of recklessness are charged,6 and require a special
verdict when the defense is raised.7 They would also permit
involuntary commitment of defendants acquitted by reason of
diminished capacity.8 Both imprisonment and subsequent hos-
pitalization of defendants found guilty of some crimes but
acquitted of others by reason of diminished capacity are
authorized.9 In addition, these bills would permit the prosecu-
tor to impose the insanity defense on unwilling criminal
defendants, subjecting them to confinement in a state psychiat-
ric facility. 0 The net effect of these proposed changes is to
severely restrict the effectiveness of the diminished capacity
defense and to provide for continued custodial control of
upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has caused
substantial loss or damage to the property of others....
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020 (1988). In In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109
(1982), the Washington Supreme Court held that the state must demonstrate a "likeli-
hood of serious harm" by presenting evidence of "a recent overt act." Id. at 284, 654
P.2d at 113. Thus, it is likely that many defendants acquitted because of a diminished
capacity defense could not be involuntarily committed under the state's Involuntary
Treatment Act. For a general description of commitment under this statute, see Dur-
ham and La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broaden-
ing the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395 (1985).
4. Substitute House Bill No. 1179, 51st Leg., 1989, Wash., read first time Mar. 1,
1989 [hereinafter S.H.B. 1179] on file. Predecessor bills include: House Bill No. 1179,
50th Leg., Wash., read first time Jan. 18, 1989; House Bill No. 1432, 50th Leg., 1988,
Wash., read first time Jan. 15, 1988; Substitute House Bill No. 1432, 50th Leg., Wash.,
read first time Feb. 5, 1988. These earlier bills contained most of the provisions
contained in Substitute House Bill No. 1179 (though they sometimes varied) as well as
other provisions. Unless otherwise indicated, our discussion will focus on S.H.B. 1179
since it is the most recent bill introduced for consideration. Of course, future
legislation on this subject may vary in form and content.
5. See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 155-167 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 147-167 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
10. This provision is designed to overturn the Washington State Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Jones, 99 Wash. 2d 735, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983) which held that the
insanity defense could not be imposed on an unwilling defendant who was competent
to stand trial. This article will not analyze this particular provision.
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defendants who use it successfully.1'
These bills appear to be a response to a rising public fear 2
that "bad actors" who commit serious crimes are increasingly
abusing the diminished capacity defense 3 to avoid well-
deserved criminal punishment.' 4  In short, the bills are
designed to chill assertion of this defense in Washington and to
ensure continued state control over those who assert it
successfully.
This article will discuss the historical development of the
diminished capacity defense and analyze its current conceptual
structure and use in Washington. We will then analyze the
most recently proposed bill attacking the diminished capacity
defense in this state, Substitute House Bill No. 1179.'" Should
this legislation (or some variation thereof) be enacted in future
sessions, the Washington Supreme Court will undoubtedly be
forced to review powerful constitutional challenges to the
validity of convictions obtained under the new law. At the
very least, the court will have to determine whether the dimin-
ished capacity defense is constitutionally required. The court
will also have to decide whether it should be characterized as a
means of negating the mental state of the crime charged or as
an affirmative defense. This decision will determine whether
the evidentiary burdens of production and persuasion should
rest with the defendant or with the State. Finally, the court
will have to ascertain whether compulsory commitment of an
acquitted defendant following use of a special verdict is
constitutional.
This article will analyze the fundamental alterations
11. S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4, §§ 4(4), 7, 11-15.
12. For a discussion of public fears regarding the diminished capacity defense in
California, see Comment, The Relevance of Innocence: Proposition 8 and the
Diminished Capacity Defense, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1197, 1211-15 (1983) [hereinafter
Comment, Proposition 8 and the Diminished Capacity Defense].
13. S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4, § 2(2)(3), rejects the commonplace term of
"diminished capacity" and renames it "criminal mental deficiency." This article will
use both terms interchangeably, though the latter term appears to be limited to mental
illness and excludes by inference voluntary intoxication. It should be noted that the
Legislature has not previously codified this defense.
14. See Memorandum from Michael C. Redman, Executive Secretary, Washington
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (W.A.P.A.), to Senator Kent Pullen and
Members, Senate Law and Justice Committee (Feb. 24, 1988); Memorandum from
Gary R. Tabor, Chief Criminal Deputy, Thurston County Prosecuting Attorney, to
Michael C. Redman, Executive Secretary, W.A.P.A. (Dec. 10, 1989) (regarding
Thurston County problems with diminished capacity) (on file at the University of
Puget Sound Law Review).
15. See S.H.B. 1179 supra note 4.
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which S.H.B. 1179 proposes in light of Washington case law,
federal constitutional requirements, and emerging trends in
legislative reform. Finally, we will suggest the probable
response of the Washington Supreme Court should the pro-
posed legislation (or some variation thereof) be enacted. In so
doing, we hope both to clarify the diminished capacity defense
in Washington and to demarcate the permissible boundaries of
legislative reform.
In our view, many aspects of the legislative proposals to
modify the diminished capacity defense are unconstitutional.
If any or all of these anticipated constitutional challenges
prove successful, a number of criminals convicted after enact-
ment of this bill would be entitled to a new trial. Such result
would impose significant burdens on the administration of jus-
tice as well as increase the prospect that a number of danger-
ous criminals would be released from prison or from
psychiatric facilities.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSES
Despite its relatively young history, the diminished capac-
ity defense has proven to be exceptionally confusing and troub-
lesome to courts and scholars alike. 6 This is not surprising
since there are several versions of the diminished capacity
defense, each with a fundamentally different conceptual basis.
In order to understand Washington's version and the doctrinal
and constitutional consequences which follow, it is useful to
first visit the various formulations.
A. The British Defense of "Diminished Responsibility":
Formal Mitigation
The "diminished responsibility" defense was a creation of
Scottish common law. 17 Subsequently, Great Britain enacted
it in statutory form at a time when capital punishment was
16. See Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984) [hereinafter Morse, Undiminished Confusion]; Arenella, The
Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a
Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977) [hereinafter, Arenella, Diminished
Capacity]; Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases, supra note 1, at 1051; Dix,
Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished
Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE Sci. 313 (1971).
17. See HM Advocate v. Dingwall, (1867) J.C. 466 (Scot.); N. WALKER, CRIME AND
INSANITY IN ENGLAND, THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 138-46 (1968).
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still used in premeditated murder cases.'8 Under the British
statute, a defendant charged with first degree murder could
introduce evidence showing he was mentally disturbed at the
time of the offense. If the jury agreed, it could find him guilty
of manslaughter even though the prosecution had proved allof the elements of murder. The jury was permitted to enter a
more lenient verdict because the defendant was mentally ill at
the time of his crime. A verdict of manslaughter would avoid a
possible death sentence being imposed on a mentally disturbed
offender. In essence, the British doctrine of "diminished
responsibility" is a form of mitigation in punishment.' 9
Because a defendant was mentally disturbed, the jury is essen-
tially deciding that he had acted with "diminished responsibil-
ity" and should not be executed.2 °
B. California's Diminished Capacity Defense: The
"Normative Approach"
Under the prodding of well-known psychiatrists such as
Bernard Diamond,2' the California Supreme Court created its
own version of the diminished capacity defense. The court ini-tially required admission of psychiatric testimony if it tended
to establish that the defendant could not have acted with the
mental state required for conviction.2 However, the court did
18. English Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, ch. II, S. 2 (1):
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be
convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of
mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially
impaired the mental responsibility for acts and omissions in doing or being a
party to the killing.... A person who but for this section would be liable...
to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of
manslaughter.
This section authorizes the jury to find a defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than
murder if he was mentally ill at the time of the offense.
19. See Dell, Diminished Responsibility Reconsidered, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 809(1982). The German Criminal Code of 1969 provides a similar defense. If mental
illness severely impairs a defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act
or to act in accordance with such understanding, then he is subject to a lesser
punishment. German Criminal Code of 1969. S. StGB, Law of July 4, 1969 (Zweites
Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts [1969] Bundesgesetzblatt, Pt.1).
20. See generally Arenella, Diminished Capacity, supra note 16, at 826.
21. Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STANFORD L. REV.. 59
(1961).
22. In the 1949 case of People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert denied, 338
U.S. 836 (1949), the court reversed a capital conviction of a paranoid prison inmate who
struck a corrections officer because he claimed to fear for his life. The court held thatpsychiatric testimony should have been permitted to establish that the defendant could
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not stop with simply requiring that evidence probative of mens
rea had to be admitted in a criminal trial.
During the 1960s the court handed down a series of pro-
vocative landmark cases which essentially redefined the state
of mind elements required for conviction of homicide in Cali-
fornia. In People v. Wolff 23 the court reversed the first degree
conviction of a 15-year-old schizophrenic youth who had
planned and deliberately killed his mother so he could carry
out his violent sexual fantasies on neighborhood teen-age girls.
The court agreed that Wolff was responsible under California's
M'Naghten test of legal insanity since he knew killing another
human being was prohibited by law. Nonetheless, it held that
the undisputed psychiatric evidence admitted at trial estab-
lished that the defendant was mentally ill and, consequently,
could not "maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the grav-
ity" of his contemplated act.24 The court thereupon convicted
him of second degree murder.
Later, in People v. Conley2" the court decided that a
defendant was entitled to introduce evidence of mental illness
and voluntary intoxication to reduce a charge of first degree
murder to voluntary manslaughter. The court concluded that
such evidence might demonstrate that the defendant did not
act with "malice aforethought" because he was "unable to com-
prehend his duty to govern his actions in accord with the duty
imposed by the law."26
In 1976 the California Supreme Court held, in People v.
Poddar, that: "If it is established that an accused, because he
not act with the mens rea or state of mind required for conviction of the capital
offense of assaulting a prison guard "with malice aforethought." During the 1960s, the
court went beyond this simple holding and expanded the defense significantly. See
infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
23. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
24. Id. at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
25. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966). In this case the defendant
deliberately shot and killed his lover and her estranged husband after she had
announced her intention to reconcile with her husband. The defendant had drunk
heavily before the killings. A psychologist testified that "the defendant was in a
dissociative state at the time of the killings and because of personality fragmentation
did not function with his normal personality." Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr.
at 818.
26. Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (emphasis added). After this
case was used to reduce a verdict of manslaughter in the case of Dan White who killed
Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk, the California Legislature
overruled it by enacting section 188 of the California Penal Code. This section
provides that "an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws
regulating society. . .is [not] included within the definition of malice."
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suffered a diminished capacity, was... unable to act in accord-
ance with the law" he could only be convicted of manslaugh-
ter.27 Thus, under California's ever-expanding diminished
capacity defense, volitional as well as cognitive impairment
caused by mental illness might negate the "malice afore-
thought" necessary for conviction of both first and second
degree murder.
California's highest court had essentially used the dimin-
ished capacity defense to infuse new meaning into the statu-
tory elements of first and second degree homicide. In so doing,
the court had created a "mini-insanity" defense."8 If either
mental illness or voluntary intoxication had interfered with
the defendant's cognitive or volitional functioning, then he
might only be convicted of voluntary manslaughter, even
though he was not sufficiently impaired to be considered
legally insane.
The California Supreme Court can be legitimately criti-
cized for playing fast and loose with the legislature's definition
of murder. Essentially, the court had changed the homicide
elements from simple "descriptive" terms, identifying pur-
poseful mental states like planning and prediction of causal
consequences, into "normative" terms, requiring both subjec-
tive awareness of wrongdoing and ability to conform to the
law. 9
This judicially-fabricated doctrine was, in large measure,
intended to avoid the harsh impact of California's continued
reliance on the M'lVaghten test for legal insanity.30 The dimin-
ished capacity defense created greater doctrinal flexibility to
take into account an individual's personal characteristics in
assessing criminal responsibility. On the other hand, it defied
27. People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 758, 518 P.2d 342, 348, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 916
(1974) (emphasis added). Poddar, a student at the University of California at Berkeley
from India, told a psychologist that he intended to kill his lover when she returned
from abroad. He subsequently did just that. A companion case held that
psychotherapists had a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent a dangerous patient
from causing harm to a readily identifiable victim. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
28. See Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 16; and Morse, Diminished
Capacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum, 2 INT'L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 271 (1979).
29. G. Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 250-259 (1978).
30. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). The
M'Naghten test excuses a mentally ill offender only if, as a result of mental illness at
the time of the offense, he was unable to know the nature and quality of the act or
that it was wrong. Only if the defendant's cognitive function is completely impaired
will he be excused under the test.
1989]
8 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 13:1
consistent application and equal treatment under the law."
Moreover, once psychiatric evidence was admitted to prove or
disprove the mental states required for conviction in homicide
cases, it became virtually impossible to keep out such testi-
mony in many other criminal offenses.
Initially, the California court limited the availability of the
defense to "specific intent" crimes,3 2 precluding its use in so-
called "general intent" crimes.33 But the court eventually jet-
tisoned even this restraining device and ruled that the dimin-
ished capacity defense permitted a defendant to negate the
mental state required for any subjective mental state, includ-
ing that required for burglary, even if there was no lesser
included offense of which he could be convicted. 4 A successful
defendant could be acquitted and entitled to walk out of the
courtroom a free man.
3 5
It should be noted that California voters, as part of a law
and order reform, abolished the "defense" of diminished capac-
ity by popular initiative in 1982.36 However, criminal defend-
31. Note, A Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
561 (1971).
32. LaFave and Scott define "specific intent" to "designate a special mental
element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to
the actus reus of the crime." W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw § 3.5(e) at 224
(2d ed. 1986).
33. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969) (excluding
evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate the mens rea required for assault with a
deadly weapon since this was a "general intent" crime rather than a "specific intent"
crime).
34. People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
35. Id.
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988):
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal
action, as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an
accused person's intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall
not be admissible to show or negate capacity to form the particular purpose,
intent, motive, malice aforethought, knowledge, or other mental state
required for the commission of the crime charged.
(b) In any criminal proceeding, including any juvenile court proceeding,
in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall
be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing
right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, evidence of diminished capacity or of
a mental disorder may be considered by the court only at the time of
sentencing or other disposition or commitment.
(d) The provisions of this section shall not be amended by the Legislature
except by statute passed in each house by roll call vote entered in the journal
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ants are still permitted, subject to limits on the form of expert
testimony, to introduce evidence of mental illness to negate the
criminal state of mind.37
C. The "Capacity" Approach: One Step Removed
Another approach to this doctrinal labyrinth is the socalled "capacity" version. In this variation, the mental health
expert renders an expert opinion on the defendant's "capacity"
to entertain the criminal state of mind.38 This testimony does
not directly address itself to whether the defendant actually
acted with the culpability required for conviction. Rather, it
focuses on the necessary pre-conditions for acting with culpa-
bility; namely, the intellectual and psychological processes
essential to form mental states.
This approach has the advantage of seemingly separating
the expert opinion-whether mental illness destroyed the
defendant's capacity for thinking in a criminal fashion-from
the jury's fact-finding task-whether the defendant actually
thought in a criminal fashion. Ostensibly, this division of labor
should prevent expert domination of the jury. However, it didnot always work out that way. After all, once an expert has
concluded that the defendant could not form a criminal state
of mind, how can a jury possibly decide that the defendant
actually did form it? 3 9
D. Diminished Capacity as a Rule of Evidence
The simplest version of the diminished capacity defense isbest understood as-in effect-a rule of evidence. If evidence
logically tends to establish or negate a mental state of a crime,
then either the defendant or the government is entitled to
two-thirds of the membership concurring, or by a statute that becomes
effective only when approved by the electors.
(emphasis added). This provision has been upheld by an intermediary appellate court.
People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
37. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; infra note 180 and accompanying
text.
38. The California court also adopted this approach. See, e.g., People v. Wolff, 61Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411
P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
39. Of course, a prosecution expert might testify that the defendant did have thecapacity to form the required mental state, thereby offsetting the defense expert'spotentially dominating testimony. The real point, however, is that it is difficult for a
jury to conclude that the defendant did form the required state of mind if an expert
has testified that he could not form that same state of mind.
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introduce such evidence for the jury's consideration. Thus, if
voluntary intoxication or mental illness prevented a defendant
from acting with "premeditation" or "intent" or whatever
mental state the statute requires for conviction, that defendant
may present such evidence in a criminal trial.
In this context the diminished capacity defense is not an
affirmative defense. It is merely a recognition by courts that
psychiatric testimony may be logically relevant to the determi-
nation of whether the defendant acted with the mental atti-
tude required for conviction. As the court in United States v.
Pohlot4 ° said: "Properly understood, it [the diminished capac-
ity defense] is therefore not a defense at all, but merely a rule
of evidence."'"
It is this version of the diminished capacity defense which
Washington has adopted. Washington courts have consistently
held that evidence of mental illness or voluntary intoxication
is admissible if it tends to prove or disprove a mental state
required for conviction.42 Unlike a defendant in Great Britain
or California, a defendant in Washington will not be found
guilty of a less serious charge and punished less severely
because he was mentally ill and impaired at the time of the
crime. A defendant in Washington will be convicted of first
degree murder if he kills with "premeditation" and "intent."4
He will not be convicted of a less serious offense unless he
proves that either mental illness or voluntary intoxication suf-
ficiently interfered with his ability to form the required
mental state to negate that element of the crime.
With this somewhat cursory excursion through the heavily
thicketed landscape of the diminished capacity defense, it is
now time to turn our attention to the structure of Washing-
ton's criminal law and the proposed legislation.
III. THE BASIC PREMISE
Answers to the questions raised by S.H.B. 1179 depend in
large part upon the Washington Supreme Court's adherence to
general principles of culpability44 and to procedural safe-
40. 827 F.2d. 889 (3rd Cir. 1987).
41. Id. at 897.
42. See infra notes 71-117 and accompanying text.
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(a) (1988).
44. It is a basic concept of the criminal law that a defendant be found to have
committed an act with the requisite mental state before criminal responsibility will
attach. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 32, at 193. Strict liability for certain acts
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guards" traditionally required by the criminal law.
A. The Elements of a Crime
To convict a criminal defendant in Washington, the prose-
cutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of a
crime set forth in the criminal statute.46 Usually, these ele-
ments consist of acting and thinking. All Washington felonies
require the government to prove that the defendant committed
an act and also possessed the requisite mental state of the
offense.47 R.C.W. 9A.08.010 sets out the general requirements
of culpability and lists the basic mental states in descending
hierarchical order: intent, knowledge, recklessness, and crimi-
nal negligence.48 When a criminal statute specifies any of
these mental states as an element of a crime, the state bears
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 49 that the
requisite mental state existed at the time of the offense. The
defense, of course, can introduce evidence tending to negate
the element. Thus, for example, a defendant charged with
theft of another's property is free to show that he thought the
property he took was his.
Evidence highly probative of the defendant's mental state
has been held to be constitutional; this gives the state legislature the power to enact
statutes excluding the mental element of the offense. However, most of the common
law felonies have developed so as to require that both actus reus and mens rea
elements be satisfied. Id. at 242, 246. See also WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010
(1987) (defining various levels of culpability).
45. E.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
charged"). See also Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too: The
Constitutional Dilemma of Mental Abnormality and Intoxication Defenses, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 221 (1984) [hereinafter Mandiberg, Protecting Society and
Defendants Too]. The author cites precedent for a defendant's constitutional right to
present evidence to negate an element of the offense.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.100 (1987).
47. Trowbridge, Competency and Criminal Responsibility in Washington, 21
GONZ. L. REV. 691, 729 (1985/86) (an act or omission to act where there is a legal duty
to act is the actus reus and the state of mind required to commit the crime is the mens
rea) [hereinafter Trowbridge, Criminal Responsibility in Washington]. W. LAFAVE &
A. Scorr, supra note 32, § 3.2 at 195, § 3.4 at 212.
48. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010 (1987). "Intent," "knowledge," and
"recklessness" are "subjective" states of mind in that the prosecution must establish
that the defendant actually acted with those mental attitudes. "Negligence" is an
objective standard of culpability. The prosecutor must demonstrate that a reasonable
person would not have acted as the defendant did.
49. The United States Supreme Court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), firmly
established the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof applicable to all
material elements of the offense in a criminal prosecution.
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which challenges the prosecution's prima facie case is crucial
to the defendant's case.5" If it tends to establish that the
defendant did not act with the statutory mental state, the jury
may decide that he did not commit the crime charged. Several
commentators have asserted that a defendant has a constitu-
tional right to present this type of evidence.51
The case most often cited in support of this contention is
Chambers v. Mississippi. 52 In this case, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a defendant is entitled to present
evidence that is competent and relevant to disprove the exist-
ence of any element of the crime charged. This right is not
absolute. However, any limitation is subject to a rigorous bal-
ancing of the defendant's due process rights with the state's
interests.53 The state's interest must be compelling in order to
foreclose the defendant's introduction of evidence that may
provide the only basis of his or her defense and that potentially
negates a material element of the crime.' For example, the
Ninth Circuit has found that the state has a compelling inter-
est in maintaining an efficient and reliable trial process.55
Therefore, in the interest of judicial efficiency, the state may
be able to limit or exclude negativing evidence if, for example,
it is weak or cumulative or if it tends to confuse the issues,
despite the defendant's right to rebut the prosecution's case.56
B. Affirmative Defenses
Affirmative defenses permit a defendant to avoid criminal
conviction and punishment by demonstrating either that his
50. Comment, A Hornbook to the Code, 48 WASH. L. REV. 149, 178 (1972) (asserting
that all relevant evidence bearing on issue of mens rea is admissible to disprove its
existence). The article also asserts that exclusion of such evidence may violate the
constitutional right to have all elements proved by the state beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 179 n.165.
51. See Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too, supra note 45, at 228-
30 n.40; Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 16, at 6-7 nn.14-15; Comment,
Proposition 8 and the Diminished Capacity Defense, supra note 12, at 1202-03. All of
these articles cite to the United States Supreme Court case Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284 (1973), which recognizes the accused's fundamental right to present
evidence in his/her own defense notwithstanding rules of procedure and evidence to
the contrary.
52. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
53. Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too, supra note 45, at 229.
54. Id. at 230. Exclusion of relevant evidence makes the prosecution's burden of
proof illusory and is inconsistent with principles of American jurisprudence. Id. at 234
n.61.
55. Id. at 232 n.47, 236 n.71 (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983)).
56. Id. at 236.
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conduct was justified (such as in the case of self-defense"7 ) or
that he should be excused either because of the situation (as in
the case of duress) or because of severe mental impairment
(such as insanity)."' The defendant must demonstrate the ele-
ments required by the particular affirmative defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.5 9 If the prosecution establishes
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and the
defendant fails to establish an affirmative defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the jury should convict the defendant.
C Burdens of Proof
Beginning with In re Winship,6' the United States
Supreme Court has expressly required the government to
prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court held that the prosecution must prove "every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
charged."'61 Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur,62 the
Court created some confusion by extending the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard to some facts seemingly extrinsic to
the definition of the crime. The Court then, in an attempt to
clarify the Mullaney decision, decided in Patterson v. New
York 3 that a defendant could be required to prove the affirm-
ative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The Court based its holding on the
formal distinction between an element of the crime set forth in
the statutory definition and an identified fact not contained in
57. For a discussion of self-defense in Washington, see La Fond, The Case for
Liberalizing the Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 237
(1983) [hereinafter La Fond, Self-Defense].
58. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 32.
59. An affirmative defense is generally one in which the burdens of production
and persuasion shift to the defendant requiring him to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that facts exist which support exculpation. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1335 n.17
(1979) [hereinafter Jeffries & Stephan, Burden of Proof]. It should be noted that the
insanity defense is an affirmative defense in a majority of jurisdictions. An affirmative
defense can also be viewed as a means of "confession and avoidance" differing from a
defense which negates a material element, thereby resulting in a finding that no crime
was committed at all. See generally Comment, Proposition 8 and the Diminished
Capacity Defense, supra note 12, at 1198-99 (cited for the proposition that the two
defenses are distinctly separate). See also State v. Carter, 5 Wash. App. 802, 643 P.2d
916 (1982).
60. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
61. Id. at 363.
62. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
63. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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the statutory definition (such as provocation or emotional dis-
turbance) that may be proved to mitigate guilt or punishment.
In essence, the Court permitted a shift in the burden of proof
to the defendant so long as the fact to be proved was not for-
mally an element of the crime's definition.'
The Washington Supreme Court has rigorously adhered to
this approach. In determining whether the absence of self-
defense was an element of the crime which the prosecution
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or an affirmative
defense which the defendant had to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the court has scrupulously parsed the
statutory definition of the charged crime to ascertain the defi-
nitional elements.6 5 It seems highly unlikely that the Wash-
ington Supreme Court would not consider the mental states of
culpability as elements which the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the court would surely
conclude that the defendant has a constitutional right to pres-
ent evidence which tends to negate these alleged mental
states.6
IV. THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
To effectively answer the questions raised by S.H.B. 1179,
it is necessary to explore the background of the diminished
capacity defense in Washington as well as to discuss the analo-
gous defense of intoxication. Although the diminished capacity
defense has existed for more than sixty years, its development
has been erratic and troublesome for the courts. This section
will summarize the development of the diminished capacity
defense in Washington and seek to clarify its present form.
A. Early Cases: A Prelude
Washington has had some form of the diminished capacity
defense since 1925.67 The doctrine is court-made, and much of
the case law is vague as to its origin and scope.68 Early on,
64. For a more complete discussion of these three cases, see Jeffries & Stephan,
Burden of Proof, supra note 59, at 1325-97.
65. For a thorough discussion of the Washington Supreme Court's approach in the
case of self-defense, see La Fond, Self-Defense, supra note 57, at 259.
66. See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
67. Trowbridge, Criminal Responsibility in Washington, supra note 47, at 729.
68. It is surprising that the doctrine has not been codified given the emphasis
placed upon the various mental states delineated in the Code. Comment, Hornbook to
the Code, supra note 50, at 178.
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Washington grappled with the notion of a diminished capacity
defense. Although never quite reaching the issue, the courts
discussed the idea of admitting evidence to prove the existence
of a mental defect which, though not establishing legal
insanity, nonetheless, impaired the ability of the actor to form
the requisite intent. Most of the early cases6 9 focused specifi-
cally on voluntary intoxication rather than on mental
disability.
It was not until the 1960s and early 1970s that the Wash-
ington courts began to recognize mental disease or defect short
of insanity as relevant to assessing guilt or innocence in a crim-
inal trial.7° It was at this time that the courts started allowing
defendants to introduce at trial competent evidence of mental
disease or defect which tended logically to disprove the exist-
ence of the mental element of the crime.
The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. White,71 took
a major step in the evolution of the defense when it said in
dicta:
The presence of a mental disease or defect which falls short
of criminal insanity may well be relevant to issues involving
the elements or degrees of certain crimes, e.g., where malice,
premeditation or intent are in issue. An accused who has
the necessary capacity to premeditate, for instance, may still
introduce evidence that he is suffering from mental disease
or defect, which disease or defect substantially reduces the
probability that he actually did premeditate with regard to
the crime with which he is charged.72
Though White dealt with insanity, the court appeared ready to
permit evidence of mental disorder to be presented by a crimi-
nal defendant at trial if it potentially negated an element of
the offense. The court cited two California Supreme Court
cases73 that allowed admission of such evidence by the defend-
69. State v. Schneider, 158 Wash. 504, 291 P. 1093 (1930); State v. Byers, 136 Wash.
620, 241 P. 9 (1925).
70. See generally State v. Ferrick, 81 Wash. 2d 942, 506 P.2d 860 (1973); State v.
White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962); State v. Martin, 14 Wash. App. 74, 538 P.2d
873 (1975); State v. Carter, 5 Wash. App. 802, 490 P.2d 1346 (1971) (cited for the
proposition that the presence of a mental condition not amounting to criminal insanity
is relevant to elements or degrees of certain crimes involving specific intent).
71. 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962) (defendant, convicted of first degree
murder of one person and second degree murder of a second person, appealed use of
M'Naghten instruction and failure to use A.L.I. test for mental irresponsibility).
72. Id at 588, 374 P.2d at 964.
73. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal.
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ant tending to prove that he could not (and therefore did not)
form the requisite mental state of the crime charged because of
mental abnormality.
Although it was merely dicta, the language of that case set
in motion the development of the diminished capacity defense
in Washington. The White case specifically recognized the
harshness of the insanity defense and the need to determine
culpability and criminal responsibility in varying degrees.
B. The Specific Intent Approach
Several years later, the court further developed the
defense by linking its viability to the existence of a "specific
intent" rather than a "general intent" element in the defini-
tion of the crime.7" "General intent" is often used interchange-
ably with the broad notion of mens rea or criminal intent.
However, it is also the term used when no specific state of
mind is required by the criminal statute.75 "Specific intent" is
most commonly viewed as a special mental element that is
required beyond any mental element associated directly with
the actus reus of the crime.76 However, the difference between
general and specific intent is often difficult to delineate. Too
often, courts have resorted to mere conclusory analysis based
on vague policy considerations in deciding whether a particular
crime was one of "general" or "specific" intent.77
Several cases 78 in the 1970s held that a mental condition
not amounting to criminal insanity was relevant to the deter-
mination of elements or degrees of crimes involving specific
intent. The courts determined that competent evidence would
be admissible if a proper foundation was laid that logically and
reasonably connected the defendant's mental impairment to
his inability to form the specific intent required by the defini-
tion of the crime.79
2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949). For a general discussion of these two cases, see Comment,
Proposition 8 and the Diminished Capacity Defense, supra note 12, at 1200-01 nn.11-13.
74. See supra note 69 and cases cited therein.
75. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 32, § 3.5 at 224.
76. Id.
77. See generally Trowbridge, Criminal Responsibility in Washington, supra note
47, at 733. Washington clarified this confusing distinction by delineating levels of
culpable mental states in WASH. REV. CODE Title 9A. These definitions were based
largely on the Model Penal Code.
78. See cases cited supra note 70.
79. State v. Carter, 5 Wash. App. 802, 490 P.2d 1346 (1971). The court held in
Carter that "[a]ny competent evidence which logically, naturally and by reasonable
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Despite the seemingly rigid structure of the defense, the
courts failed to clearly spell out what would amount to a
proper foundation. One court indicated that psychiatric testi-
mony must establish a probability that the defendant's mental
condition affected formation of the requisite intent at the time
of the crime.8 0 However, this rule still conferred broad discre-
tion on the trial court and almost invited arbitrary expert
testimony.
A few years later, in State v. Martin,' the court sought to
delineate the requirements for a diminished capacity defense.
In order to establish a sufficient foundation for the admissibil-
ity of evidence, the court set up a three-part test. A foundation
must be laid which:
(a) shows that the expert is qualified to testify on the sub-
ject by training and experience and that the testimony will
be based upon facts relating to the defendant and the case;
(b) exhibits that the testimony will be based upon reason-
able medical certainty; and (c) connects a mental disorder of
the defendant with an inability to form the specific intent to
commit the crime charged. 2
Although the court attempted in this case to clarify the foun-
dational requirements necessary for a successful offer of proof,
they remained rather vague until the early 1980s.
C. The Modern Approach
The foundational requirements articulated in the 1970s
were modified to incorporate the language of R.C.W. 9A.08.010
inference to prove or disprove a material issue is relevant and should be admitted
unless it is specifically inadmissible by reason of some affirmative rule of law." This
was affirmed in State v. Ferrick:
The presence of a mental condition not amounting to criminal insanity is
relevant to the elements or degrees of certain crimes involving specific
intent .... Thus, competent evidence of such a condition is admissible
wherever it tends logically and by reasonable inference to prove or disprove
that a defendant was capable of forming a required specific intent. However,
in order to support an instruction on diminished capacity not only must there
be substantial evidence of such a condition, but the evidence must logically
and reasonably connect the defendant's alleged mental condition with the
asserted inability to form the required specific intent to commit the crime
charged.
81 Wash. 2d 942, 506 P.2d 860 (1973).
80. State v. Moore, 7 Wash. App. 1, 499 P.2d 16 (1972).
81. 14 Wash. App. 74, 538 P.2d 873 (1975).
82. Id at 77, 538 P.2d at 876.
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(which defined culpability terms) 3 and were developed in an
influential opinion by the Court of Appeals in State v.
Edmon. 4 Edmon rejected the concepts of "specific" and "gen-
eral" intent8 5 and, in their place, adopted an analysis which
focused on the four levels of culpability. 6 The court concluded
that psychiatric evidence was admissible whenever the mental
states of "intent" and "knowledge" were at issue. The test
required the evidence to demonstrate that the defendant's
mental disorder substantially reduced the likelihood that the
defendant formed the requisite intent and to explain how the
mental disorder had this effect.8 7 The court noted that "[t]he
83. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
84. 28 Wash. App. 98, 103-04, 621 P.2d 1310, 1313-14, review denied, 95 Wash. 2d
1019 (1981). The test is as follows:
An expert may give an opinion regarding the defendant's ability to form a
specific intent when the following foundational requirements are satisfied:
1. The defendant lacked the ability to form a specific intent due to a mental
disorder not amounting to insanity.
2. The expert is qualified to testify on the subject.
3. The expert personally examines and diagnoses the defendant and is able
to testify to an opinion with reasonable medical certainty.
4. The expert's testimony is based on substantial supporting evidence in the
record relating to the defendant and the case, or there must be an offer to
prove such evidence. The supporting evidence must accurately reflect the
record and cannot consist solely of uncertain estimates or speculation.
5. The cause of the inability to form a specific intent must be a mental
disorder, not emotions like jealousy, fear, anger, and hatred.
6. The mental disorder must be causally connected to a lack of specific
intent, not just reduced perception, overreaction or other irrelevant mental
states.
7. The inability to form a specific intent must occur at a time relevant to the
offense.
8. The mental disorder must substantially reduce the probability that the
defendant formed the alleged intent.
9. The lack of specific intent may not be inferred from evidence of the
mental disorder, and it is insufficient to only give conclusory testimony that a
mental disorder caused an inability to form specific intent. The opinion must
contain an explanation of how the mental disorder had this effect.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. For a general discussion of general and specific intent, see Trowbridge,
Criminal Responsibility in Washington, supra note 47, at 732-33.
86. The court in Edmon commenting on the traditional rule of specific intent
controlling the use of the diminished capacity defense stated:
The rule must be modified because R.C.W. Title 9A was designed to replace
concepts like specific and general intent with the four levels of culpability in
R.C.W. § 9A.08.010(a). Whenever, "intent" as defined in R.C.W. 9A.08.010(a) is
an element of a crime, it may be challenged by competent evidence of a
mental disorder that causes an inability to form intent at the time of the
offense.
Edmon, 28 Wash. App. at 103-104, 621 P.2d at 1314.
87. Id. at 103, 621 P.2d at 1313.
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fine distinction between the intent to produce a result (specific
intent) and the awareness of a result of one's conduct (knowl-
edge) should not determine the admissibility of expert medical
evidence of a mental disability caused by a mental disorder. 8 8
The Washington Supreme Court expanded this approach
in State v. Griffin.9 In Griffin, the court reversed a convic-
tion of three counts of forgery, stating that the trial court's
refusal to instruct on mental capacity was reversible error.
The court affirmed the principles recited in Ferrick and
Edmon and then went on to say: "Although the jury in this
case may have been presented with evidence to support a
defense theory of diminished capacity, it was not properly
instructed to understand the effect diminished capacity had
upon formation of criminal intent."'9 ° Generalized instructions
on criminal intent are not sufficient to apprise a jury of mental
disorders which may diminish a defendant's capacity to commit
a crime. Griffin appears to mandate the use of a diminished
capacity instruction in all cases in which the proffered evi-
dence satisfies the foundational requirements. 9' Without such
an instruction, the jury is left to guess at the relation of psychi-
atric evidence about mental disorder to the non-existence of
the requisite mental state.
It is unclear, however, to what mental states the dimin-
ished capacity defense applies. The cases clearly indicate that
the old concepts of "specific" and "general" intent need not be
the determining factors,92 but fail to indicate whether dimin-
ished capacity evidence is applicable to all subjective mental
states. The scope of the doctrine in Washington becomes
clearer in light of cases involving the voluntary intoxication
defense.
V. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
The Washington courts have had considerable opportunity
88. Id. at 104, 621 P.2d at 1314.
89. 100 Wash. 2d 417, 418-19, 670 P.2d 265, 266 (1983).
90. Id. at 419-420, 670 P.2d at 266.
91. The current Washington pattern jury instruction reflects this rule. WPIC
18.20 (1986) reads: "Whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a
necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of mental illness or
disorder may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state."
92. State v. Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d 417, 418-19, 670 P.2d 265, 266 (1983); State v.
Edmon, 28 Wash. App. 98, 104, 621 P.2d 1310, 1314 (1981). Indeed, most Washington
criminal law cases over the past decade do not use the concept of special or general
intent crime for any purpose.
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to comment on -the validity and scope of the intoxication
defense. 3 In a recent case, State v. Coates,94 the Washington
Supreme Court stated:
Evidence of voluntary intoxication cannot form the basis of
an affirmative defense that essentially admits the crime but
attempts to excuse or mitigate the actor's criminality.
Rather, evidence of voluntary intoxication is relevant to the
trier of fact in determining in the first instance whether the
defendant acted with a particular degree of mental
culpability.95
The court also concluded that evidence of voluntary intoxica-
tion could not negate the mental state of criminal negligence
because negligence is an objective rather than a subjective
standard.' This suggests that a defendant would be allowed to
introduce evidence whenever it was likely to prove that he or
she was unable to entertain a particular subjective mental
state.
The defendant has the burden of production9 7 to introduce
evidence of intoxication, but the burden of persuasion remains
93. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.090 (1988). E.g., State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d
882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987); State v. Thomas, 109 Wash. 2d 222, 743 P.2d 816 (1987); State v.
Harris, 102 Wash. 2d 148, 685 P.2d 584 (1984); State v. Brooks, 97 Wash. 2d 873, 651 P.2d
217 (1982); State v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979); State v. James, 47
Wash. App. 605, 736 P.2d 700 (1987); State v. Sam, 42 Wash. App. 586, 711 P.2d 1114
(1986); State v. Hansen, 46 Wash. App. 292, 730 P.2d 706 (1986); State v. Mathews, 38
Wash. App. 180, 685 P.2d 605 (1984); State v. Carter, 5 Wash. App. 802, 643 P.2d 916
(1982); State v. Simmons, 30 Wash. App. 432, 635 P.2d 745 (1981). Some have treated
diminished capacity as encompassing both mental disease or defect and voluntary
intoxication. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 97 Wash. 2d 873, 651 P.2d 217 (1982). We will
treat voluntary intoxication as a doctrine distinct from diminished capacity based on
mental disease or defect, even though they can both be used to negate culpability
elements. We take this approach both because Washington statutory law specifically
addresses voluntary intoxication (WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.090) and because S.H.B.
1179 and its predecessor bills seem to consider criminal mental deficiency as a separate
defense.
94. 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987). In Coates, the defendant was charged
with second degree assault and raised voluntary intoxication as a defense claiming his
inability to form the requisite mental state. The defendant was found guilty of assault
in the third degree, a lesser included offense, requiring a showing of criminal
negligence that the court determined could not be negated by intoxication evidence.
95. Id at 889, 735 P.2d at 68.
96. Id. at 892, 735 P.2d at 70. Whenever criminal liability is based on subjective
mental states, there is always a distinct possibility that the defendant did not possess
the requisite mens rea. However, when the mens rea required is objective, the inquiry
focuses on what a reasonable person's state of mind would have been, not what the
defendant's actually was. Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 16, at 9. See
supra note 48.
97. State v. Carter, 31 Wash. App. 572, 577, 643 P.2d 916, 198 (1982). The evidence
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with the prosecution to prove the requisite mental state
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense of intoxication is,
thus, not an "affirmative defense" (though, like an affirmative
defense, the defendant has the initial burden of producing suf-
ficient evidence to justify a jury instruction on the issue).
Requiring the defendant to prove voluntary intoxication by
even a lower standard of proof would violate the defendant's
due process right to put the government to its burden of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.9" It would also have the practical
effect of requiring the defendant to prove the absence of a
material element of the crime. 9
In addition, the cases clearly indicate that a diminished
capacity defense based on voluntary intoxication is essentially
a rule of evidence. 100 If evidence is logically relevant to a
defendant's state of mind, he is entitled to present it to the
jury for their consideration. In short, it is not a substantive
defense, but a rule of admissibility. Thus, Washington case law
clearly indicates that the prosecution does not bear the burden
of disproving intoxication.101 Similarly, the defendant is not
required to prove diminished capacity as a result of
intoxication.
Both the intoxication and criminal mental deficiency
defenses are premised on the same principle. A defendant has
a fundamental right to present all competent and relevant evi-
dence tending to negate a material element of culpability set
forth in the charged offense. It would be both illogical and
morally myopic to allow a defendant to present evidence of his
self-induced mental impairment-voluntary intoxication-and
to reject it when a mentally ill defendant was not responsible
for his mental disorder or defect. 10 2
must include two things: the fact of drinking and the effect of that drinking upon
defendant's ability to form an intent. Id.
98. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
99. State v. Carter, 31 Wash. App. at 577, 643 P.2d at 920 (stating that it was errorto require the defendant to prove his voluntary intoxication by a preponderance of the
evidence).
100. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
101. State v. Sam, 42 Wash. App. 813, 711 P.2d 1114 (1986). "Once the jury hasbeen told that the prosecution has the burden of proving the required mental state,there is no need to instruct that the state must prove the absence of diminished
capacity [as a result of intoxication] .. " Id. at 815, 711 P.2d at 1116.
102. State v. Edmon, 28 Wash. App. 98, 107, 621 P.2d 1310, 1314 (1981); Morse,
Undiminished Confusion, supra note 16, at 11-12.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE LAW OF DIMINISHED CAPACITY
IN WASHINGTON
Before analyzing provisions of the bill itself, it is necessary
to draw some conclusions about Washington's mis-named
"diminished capacity defense. "103
First, the so-called diminished capacity defense in Wash-
ington is essentially a rule of evidence. Some of the cases
admit expert evidence to prove that the defendant lacked the
"capacity" or "ability" to form the necessary mental ele-
ment,"° while others hold that expert evidence is relevant to
prove the defendant did not act with the necessary state of
mind.'0 5 Some commingle the two approaches. 1° 6 Regardless
of the precise form of the expert testimony, it is simply a
court-made rule which permits a defendant in a criminal trial
to introduce evidence relevant to the presence or absence of
subjective states of mind. 0 7 It is not a plea in mitigation,' an
affirmative defense," or a normative re-fashioning of the cul-
pability elements of the crime.1 0
Second, Washington law is consistent with the constitu-
tional premise that a defendant has a fundamental right to
present evidence tending to show the presence or absence of a
required mental state that is an element of a charged crime."'
This is necessary if the defendant is to have a meaningful right
to present a defense at all. The case law concerning both
mental illness and voluntary intoxication clearly authorizes
the introduction of relevant evidence that has satisfied basic
103. Perhaps a more suitable moniker for it would be the "diminished capacity
rule of evidence."
104. State v. Harris, 102 Wash. 2d 148, 685 P.2d 584 (1984); State v. Brooks, 97
Wash. 2d 873, 651 P.2d 217 (1982); State v. Hansen, 46 Wash. App. 292, 730 P.2d 706
(1986); State v. Martin, 14 Wash. App. 74, 538 P.2d 873 (1975).
105. State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987); State v. Thomas, 109
Wash. 2d 222, 743 P.2d 816 (1987); State v. Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d 417, 670 P.2d 265
(1983); State v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979); State v. White, 60 Wash.
2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962); State v. James, 47 Wash. App. 605, 736 P.2d 700 (1987);
State v. Sam, 42 Wash. App. 813, 711 P.2d 1114 (1986); State v. Edmon, 28 Wash. App.
98, 621 P.2d 1310 (1981).
106. State v. Ferrick, 81 Wash. 2d 942, 506 P.2d 860 (1973); State v. Carter, 31
Wash. App. 572, 490 P.2d 1346 (1982).
107. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
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foundational requirements."-2
Third, in light of precedent, it appears that the Washing-
ton Supreme Court could not abolish the doctrine of criminal
mental deficiency without ignoring the substantive and proce-
dural structure of the criminal law as formulated by the
United States Supreme Court. Abolition of the doctrine would
probably run afoul of the Constitutional due process protection
provided by the burden of proof and the right to present evi-
dence in a criminal case."13
The defense of intoxication has existed for quite some
time in this state. 1 4 It permits the defendant to present evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication to rebut the prosecution's evi-
dence on the defendant's state of mind. It would be
fundamentally unfair to allow a defendant to prove he effec-
tively diminished his own capacity by indulging in intoxicating
substances but disallow it when the defendant's capacity was
diminished-through no fault of his own-by mental disease or
defect. In light of this moral conundrum, the Court is not
likely to permit such evidence only in intoxication cases." 5
Fourth, it appears that evidence of criminal mental defi-
ciency would be admissible to negate all subjective mental
states; namely, intent, knowledge and recklessness. By defini-
tion, a subjective mental state requires an understanding of the
defendant's actual cognitive processes." 6 It is not an objective
standard like negligence, which seeks to ascertain what a so-
called reasonable person would have known.
Fifth, all Washington cases analyze diminished capacity as
a means of negating an element of the crime and not as an
affirmative defense. Consequently, the burden of persuasion
on diminished capacity cannot constitutionally be shifted to the
defendant. The cases allowing both evidence of intoxication
and evidence of diminished capacity are quick to point out that
the burden must remain with the prosecution to prove all ele-
ments of the crime, including mental state, beyond a reason-
able doubt." 7 Of course, the defendant still carries the burden
of production. He must present evidence demonstrating that
112. State v. Carter, 31 Wash. App. 572, 575, 643 P.2d 916, 918 (1982); State v.
Edmon, 28 Wash. App. 98, 104, 621 P.2d 1310, 1313 (1981).
113. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
114. State v. Byers, 136 Wash. 620, 241 P. 9 (1925).
115. Edmon, 28 Wash. App. at 104, 621 P.2d at 1313.
116. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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his mental illness at the time of the offense prevented him
from forming the criminal mental state required for
conviction.
VII. SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL No. 1179-
A LEGISLATIVE EXAMPLE
Given the logic and structure of the diminished capacity
defense as developed by Washington courts, we think S.H.B.
1179 and its predecessor versions would, if enacted, be held
invalid by the Washington Supreme Court. It would be useful
at this juncture to analyze the particular constitutional infirmi-
ties of these bills.
A. Improperly Structuring Diminished Capacity as an
Affirmative Defense Rather Than a Rule of Evidence
Section 4(3) characterizes criminal mental deficiency as a
"defense."11 The bill does not explicitly require the defendant
to establish criminal mental deficiency by a preponderance of
the evidence. The bill is silent on the issue of which party
bears the burden of proof. However, in denominating criminal
mental deficiency as a "defense," it is a fair inference that the
legislature intended to impose the burden of proof on the
defendant since defendants must prove "defenses" by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.1 19
Should this prove to be the correct interpretation, this sec-
tion would probably be held invalid. As noted earlier, the Con-
stitution requires the prosecution to prove all elements of a
crime, including mental states, beyond a reasonable doubt.
120
In addition, a defendant has a constitutional right to present
relevant evidence which logically negates all elements of a
charged crime.12 Finally, precluding defendant's probative
evidence tending to negate a criminal mental state renders the
prosecution's evidence incontestable as a matter of law. This,
in turn, violates the presumption of innocence and permits the
prosecution to avoid proving all elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.122 As the Colorado Supreme Court said in
118. S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4.
119. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, supra note 32.
120. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
122. Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d. 385 (Colo. 1982) (holding that a criminal
defendant has a federal and state constitutional right to present evidence of mental
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Hendershott v. People:
A rule precluding the defendant from contesting the culpa-
bility element of the charge ['recklessness' required for con-
viction of assault in the third degree] would render the
prosecution's evidence on that issue uncontestable [sic] as a
matter of law, in derogation of the presumption of innocence
and the constitutional requirement of prosecutorial proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 23
Washington case law has explicitly held that the defense
of intoxication may not be cast as an affirmative defense since
it would result in forcing the defendant to prove the absence of
an element of the crime.124  Criminal mental deficiency is
wholly analogous to the defense of intoxication. Both permit
the defendant the opportunity to negate the mental state nec-
essary for conviction. To require the defendant to establish
criminal mental deficiency by a preponderance of the evidence
would violate the constitutional requirement that the state
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 25
It is true that a number of courts in other jurisdictions
have concluded that the diminished capacity defense is not
constitutionally required126 and that the Supreme Court has
refused to impose the diminished capacity defense on the Dis-
trict of Columbia as a constitutional requirement.' 27 The
rationale of these cases varies somewhat, but, in general, they
all rest on a shared perception that psychiatry is an inherently
uncertain discipline and that societal needs of deterrence and
public security outweigh the value of adjusting individual crim-
inal responsibility in light of personal psychological impair-
ments.128 As one court put it: "The court [in refusing to
impairment to negate the "recklessness" required for conviction of assault in the third
degree).
123. Id. at 391.
124. State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987).
125. Id.
126. Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228
(1984); Wahrlich v. Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1011 (1973); State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663 (La. 1982); Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405,
439 A.2d 542 (1982); People v. Atkins, 117 Mich. App. 430, 324 N.W.2d 38 (1982); State
v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1982); State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St. 2d 182, 436
N.E.2d 523 (1982); Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1980). But see
Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases, supra note 1; and infra note 134 and
accompanying text.
127. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). See also Bethea v. United States,
365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
128. One court aptly described the function of the defense: "In short, the doctrine
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constitutionally require the diminished capacity defense]
doubted whether psychiatry could contribute trustworthy, sci-
entifically-substantiated expert knowledge concerning an indi-
vidual's capacity to form an intent, noted the tendency of juries
to place great reliance on such experts, and doubted the effi-
cacy of cross-examination ....
The Montana Supreme Court has approved the legisla-
ture's denominating diminished capacity as an affirmative
defense. 3 ° The court concluded that: "To rebut the presump-
tion of sanity and capability of forming a purposeful or know-
ing intent, a defendant may admit evidence relevant to . ..
'prove that he did not have a particular state of mind which is
an essential element of the offense charged.' "131 Though the
statutes did not define the burden of proof to be used in con-
junction with this affirmative defense, the court concluded that
"a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he lacked the ability, due to mental disease or defect, to
form that criminal mental state which is defined by statute as
an element of the crime with which he is charged.113 2 Since
the state was not constitutionally required to provide the
defense of diminished capacity at all, the Montana Supreme
Court concluded that the legislature was free to characterize it
as an affirmative defense and impose the burdens of produc-
tion and persuasion on the defendant.
133
Nonetheless, more recent, persuasive, and compelling
authority establishes that the rule of evidence version of
[of diminished capacity] emerged from experience as an attempt to fashion a rational
and coherent method for society to treat with compassion those among us who operate
in the twilight of rationality." Muench, 715 F.2d at 1143.
129. Id. at 1136.
130. State v. McKenzie, 186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d 428, cert. denied, McKenzie v.
Montana, 449 U.S. 1050 (1980). But see Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225 (1983) (holding that the defendant cannot
constitutionally be required to prove diminished capacity by a preponderance of the
evidence).
131. McKenzie, 608 P.2d at 454 (citing Section 95-503(b)(2), R.C.M. (1947)).
132. Id.
133. This is essentially the analytic structure used by Jeffries and Stephan. See
Jeffries and Stephan, Burden of Proof, supra note 59. Other states have also cast
diminished capacity as an affirmative defense. However, these jurisdictions use the
"capacity approach." See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. Thus, the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a
mental disease or defect which could impair his capacity to entertain culpable mental
states. See generally Husley v. State, 261 Ark. 449, 549 S.W.2d 73 (Ark. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988); State v.
Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 550 A.2d 117 (1988).
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diminished capacity is constitutionally required. In United
States v. Pohlot,1A the Third Circuit concluded that Congress,
in enacting the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,135 did not
intend to exclude evidence of mental abnormality to negate
mens rea. It examined the legislative history of this bill,136
passed in the wake of the John Hinckley verdict, and con-
cluded that Congress wished to avoid the strong probability
that such a ban would be struck down as unconstitutional. 137
Though Pohlot was narrowly concerned with the 'legislative
intent' underlying this act, it carefully analyzed constitutional
law to assist it in its task. In reaching its decision, the court
said:
Finally, the government's request [to exclude evidence
of mental illness to negate criminal mental state] would
require us to raise a serious constitutional question that Con-
gress explicitly determined to avoid. Under In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970), due process requires that the govern-
ment prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. The defendant's right to present a defense
to one of those elements generally includes the right to the
admission of competent, reliable, exculpatory evidence, and
the Supreme Court has struck down 'arbitrary rules that
prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testify-
ing.' [citing, inter alia, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284]. Evidentiary rules that would bar the testimony of the
defendant himself, as would a rule barring all evidence of
mental abnormality on the issue of mens rea, need particular
justification. In light of these cases, a rule barring evidence
[of the defendant's mental abnormality] on the issue of mens
rea may be unconstitutional so long as we determine crimi-
nal liability in part through subjective states of mind.13
Only if the Washington Supreme Court changed course precip-
134. 827 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1987).
135. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 402 (a), 98 Stat. 2057, § 20 (1989) (recodified at
18 U.S.C. § 17) (West Supp. 1989).
136. See Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, House Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983) [hereinafter
Insanity Hearings].
137. Even the Reagan administration which supported abolition of the insanity
defense acknowledged that criminal defendants could introduce evidence of mental
abnormality to negate mens rea. See Hearings on Bill to Amend Title 18 to Limit the
Insanity Defense, Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1983) (testimony of
Attorney General William French Smith); Insanity Hearings, supra note 136, at 36-37
(testimony of Rudolph Giulani, Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice).
138. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900-01 (3rd Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
1989]
28 University of Puget Sound Law Review
itously and decided that evidence of mental illness was no
longer probative of the presence or absence of culpability
would such evidence be excluded. 139  Even the court in
Muensch concluded that, if a state supreme court considered
psychiatric evidence relevant to and probative of criminal
mental states, then a defendant had a constitutional right to
present that evidence to the jury.140 Given the extensive Wash-
ington precedent concluding that evidence of mental illness is
competent and relevant to prove the presence or absence of
criminal mental states, it is extremely unlikely that our state
supreme court would change its mind.
Casting the rule of evidence version of the diminished
capacity defense as an affirmative defense would almost surely
be struck down as unconstitutional. Consequently, any legisla-
tive reform of Washington's diminished capacity defense
should not undertake to denominate it as an affirmative
defense. At most, the burden of producing evidence of mental
illness can be cast on the defendant. But the burden of proving
all culpability elements of the charged crime must remain on
the prosecution.
B. Limiting Subjective Culpability Elements
Though not contained in S.H.B. 1179, section 4(3) of House
Bill No. 1179141 proposed limiting the defense of criminal
139. See also Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982) (defendant has a
federal and state constitutional right to introduce evidence of mental impairment to
negate all subjective elements of culpability, including recklessness.).
140. Muensch v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1134 (7th Cir. 1983). As the court said: "We
recognized [in Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert dismissed sub noma.,
Israel v Hughes, 439 U.S. 801 (1978) (affg 440 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (holding
that excluding evidence offered to show lack of capacity to form specific intent was
unconstitutional if the state considered it relevant to the issue).] that the state law
determines the relevance and competence of evidence .... Id. at 1134. The Pohlot
court was not persuaded by the cases, including Bethea, Fisher, Muensch, and
Wahrlich, which concluded that criminal defendants did not have a constitutional
right to present evidence of mental disability to negate subjective criminal mental
states. It noted: "These cases do not distinguish, however, as Congress has done,
between the use of evidence to negate mens rea and a broader diminished capacity
defense. The recent circuit court opinions also focus on the exclusion of expert
opinion evidence, not on the exclusion of all evidence of mental abnormality, including
the defendant's own testimony." 827 F.2d at 902 n.12.
141. Section 4(3) of HB 1179, 51st Leg., 1989, Wash., read first time Jan. 18, 1989,
provides: "Criminal mental deficiency is a defense that is limited to attacking the
mental states of premeditation, intent, malice, or knowledge required for commission
of the crime charged, and evidence of criminal mental deficiency is not admissible as a
defense against any other mental state."
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mental deficiency to the mental states of premeditation, intent,
malice or knowledge. This section implicitly excluded
recklessness. 1 42
Any defendant charged with a crime that includes a sub-
jective state of mind element must be allowed to introduce rel-
evant and probative evidence that counters the prosecution's
prima facie case on this element. 143 The evidence of criminal
mental deficiency is logically relevant to the mental state of
recklessness since, to be reckless, a defendant must knowingly
disregard a substantial unjustified risk of serious harm.4 4  Evi-
dence showing that the defendant was unable to know that a
substantial risk even existed seems highly probative of this cul-
pability element. 45 To exclude such evidence would deny the
defendant the right to present evidence on his own behalf, a
right guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 14  Any legislation
which would preclude a defendant from introducing evidence
of diminished capacity to negate recklessness would, in all like-
lihood, be held invalid.
C. Permitting Civil Commitment of an Acquitted Defendant
Section 4(4)14' authorizes the State to commit a defendant
who is acquitted 1 48 of a violent crime1 49 by reason of criminal
142. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010(c) (1988) defines "recklessness" as
follows: "A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he knows of and disregards a
substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his disregard of such substantial
risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable man would exercise in the
same situation."
143. See generally State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987); and State
v. Edmon, 28 Wash. App. 98, 621 P.2d 1310, review denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1019 (1981).
144. See supra note 142.
145. The court in Hendershott v. People specifically held that a criminal defendant
has a federal and state constitutional right to present evidence of his mental
impairment to negate "recklessness." Hendershott v. People, 659 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982).
146. The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147. S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4.
148. In most cases, a "successful" defendant using criminal mental deficiency
evidence will not be acquitted of all offenses but will be found guilty of a lesser
included offense. Comment, Hornbook to the Code, supra note 50, at 160. Acquittal
will usually result only when the crime charged contains no lesser included offenses.
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mental deficiency to a state institution for compulsory treat-
ment. Traditionally, our system of criminal justice has sought
to confine only those who have been found guilty of a crime or
acquitted by reason of insanity.15 Commitment to a state insti-
tution of a person other than a convicted criminal or an
insanity acquittee has generally been limited to the mentally
ill, 5 ' the developmentally disabled, 52 and alcoholics. 5 3 It is
not at all clear that the state can commit non-criminals who do
not fall within these special classes, either under the state's
parens patriae power or the police power.154
Assuming arguendo that it is constitutionally permissible,
specific facts invoking the state's authority under either or
both of these powers must be established at the time commit-
ment is sought. Section 7155 of S.H.B. 1179 seeks to provide a
mechanism for obtaining the necessary findings of fact to sup-
port the implementation of section 4(4). This section proposes
the use of a special verdict in certain cases asking if the jury
finds that the defendant "is not likely to commit criminal acts
jeopardizing persons or property."'5 6 If the jury cannot answer
that question affirmatively (i.e., that the defendant is not dan-
gerous), the defendant will be committed.1 7 The jury then
decides if the defendant is eligible for a less restrictive treat-
149. The legislation does not define "violent crime," thereby raising serious
constitutional issues of vagueness. Earlier versions of this legislation would have
permitted commitment of a defendant acquitted of any felony after a successful
criminal mental deficiency defense. See House Bill No. 1432, section 4(4), 50th Leg.,
1988, Reg. Sess., Wash. This might well be struck down as unconstitutionally
overbroad since it includes non-dangerous felonies.
150. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAw. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
151. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
152. Engrossed Substitute House Bill No. 1051, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess., Wash., read
first time Feb. 10, 1989.
153. See Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.96A.010-70.96A.930 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
154. For a description of the state's police power and parens patriae power, see La
Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFFALO
L. REV. 499 (1981). The Federal Bail Reform Act permits pre-trial preventive
detention of charged criminal defendants considered so dangerous that no release
conditions "will reasonably assure...the safety of any other person and the
community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This statute has been upheld
by the United States Supreme Court against constitutional attack. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Court has also upheld pre-trial preventive detention
of juveniles considered too dangerous to be at large. Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253
(1984).
155. S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4.
156. Id.
157. It is virtually impossible to ask anyone, including mental professionals, to
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ment program rather than confinement to a state mental insti-
tution. Assuming the jury decided that the defendant was not
eligible for less restrictive treatment, section 4(4) would
authorize commitment to a state institution.158
There are several significant problems with this section.
First, the only question relevant for jury consideration in a
criminal trial where evidence of criminal mental deficiency has
been introduced is whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty. Unlike the affirmative defense of insanity15 9 where evi-
dence is being introduced to excuse an otherwise guilty defend-
ant, criminal mental deficiency is being used solely to rebut
the prosecution's claim that a mental element of a crime has
been established.
Since insanity is an affirmative defense, the state can prob-
ably impose reasonable conditions on its availability and use. 60
These conditions would include automatic post-conviction com-
mitment to a secure mental health institution for evaluation
and treatment. 161  However, diminished capacity is not an
affirmative defense in Washington; it is simply a rule of evi-
dence. 62 Thus, the state cannot impose special conditions such
as involuntary commitment on defendants who simply intro-
duce evidence of mental illness relevant and probative to an
element of the charged crime. To do so would probably violate
the constitutional requirement of equal protection since there
is nothing special about this class of defendants. 63
find that any citizen is safe to be at large. If a jury cannot warrant his safety, the
legislation provides for preventive detention.
158. S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4.
159. In Washington, a special verdict form is used in insanity cases to determine
the disposition of an insanity acquittee. If the jury finds him still dangerous, he is
committed to a mental health institution for evaluation and treatment. Both the use
of this special verdict and the commitment procedure have been held valid. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.040 (1980); State v. Kolocotronis, 73 Wash. 2d 92, 436 P.2d 774
(1968); State v. Hicks, 41 Wash. App. 303, 704 P.2d 1206 (1985); State v. Corwin, 32
Wash. App. 493, 649 P.2d 119 (1982).
160. Jeffries & Stephan, Burden of Proof, supra note 59. Jeffries and Stephan
argue that, since the legislature could abolish an affirmative defense completely, a
fortiori, it can impose any conditions it chooses on the availability of the defense. This
includes allocating the burden of persuasion to the defendant. But see Underwood,
The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86
YALE L. J. 1299 (1977).
161. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Margulies, The Pandemonium
between the Mad and the Bad: Procedures of the Commitment and Release of Insanity
Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 793 (1984).
162. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
163. See Ellis, On the Usefulness of Suspect Classification, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY
375 (1986).
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In order to commit a person as mentally ill and dangerous,
the state must affirmatively establish that the defendant is
mentally ill and, as a result of such illness, that he is danger-
ous. In addition, under Addington v. Texas,164 the state must,
as a matter of constitutional due process, prove the facts neces-
sary to civilly commit a person by "clear and convincing" evi-
dence, not merely by a "preponderance of the evidence". As
the Court said:
Loss of liberty calls for showing that the individual suf-
fers from something more serious than is demonstrated by
idiosyncratic behavior. Increasing the burden of proof is one
way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the
decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that
inappropriate commitments will be ordered.
The individual should not be asked to share equally with
society the risk of error when the possible injury to the indi-
vidual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the
state. 165
The special verdict proposed in S.H.B. 1179 is defective because
it does not require the state to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is both mentally ill and dangerous.
Second, the special verdict asks the jury to determine pres-
ent dangerousness based on evidence introduced regarding cir-
cumstances at the time of the charged offense. This evidence
about past mental condition does not even purport to have any
bearing on the defendant's present mental condition or future
dangerousness. It is true that in Jones v. United States' 66 the
United States Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia
statute requiring automatic commitment and imposing special
release standards and procedures on criminal defendants who
successfully asserted the insanity defense. The Court con-
cluded that the jury verdict of "Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity" in that case established both the defendant's past
mental illness and his past dangerousness. The Court relied on
the pivotal fact that the prosecution had proven the act of
shoplifting beyond a reasonable doubt, while, in turn, the
defendant had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was mentally ill at the time of the offense. These findings
permitted an inference that such a defendant continues to be
164. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
165. Id. at 427.
166. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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both mentally ill and dangerous. 16 7
A "not guilty" verdict in a criminal trial does not establish
that the defendant did the criminal act; thus, no inference can
be drawn about the defendant's dangerousness. Moreover, this
verdict-unlike a Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity verdict
when the defendant bears the burden of proof--does not
affirmatively establish that the defendant was mentally ill.
Thus, a general verdict of acquittal in a criminal trial cannot
provide the fact-finding necessary for a continuing presump-
tion of either mental illness or dangerousness. Nor can it be
the basis for any assessment of the defendant's current or
future mental health, dangerousness, or need for treatment.
Indeed, a criminal trial, which looks backward in time, is a
very poor mechanism for diagnosing a defendant's present
mental illness and treatment prognosis or his future
dangerousness.
D. Improper Use of a Special Verdict
S.H.B. 1179 purports to finesse these obstacles by using a
special verdict in a criminal trial in which the defendant has
not raised an affirmative defense, but has merely exercised his
constitutional right to introduce evidence negating his criminal
state of mind at the time of the offense. In all probability, this
use of a special verdict in a bald attempt to establish "facts"
necessary for commitment would be held unconstitutional.
The use of special verdicts in a criminal trial has been severely
criticized by federal courts as denying a defendant his constitu-
tional right to due process."a s These verdicts can improperly
structure the jury's fact-finding task.
In addition, the special verdict in this case would commin-
gle issues of conduct, mental illness, and state of mind in the
past with the wholly different and collateral issues of present
mental illness, dangerousness, and need for treatment. The
seductive invitation contained in the special verdict is doubly
dangerous. On the one hand, it encourages the jury to find the
defendant guilty of the charged crime since it may consider
him currently mentally ill or dangerous. Conviction might,
thus, be seen as necessary to ensure his incapacitation and
167. The commission of a past criminal act (in this case shoplifting a jacket)
sufficiently revealed (at least to a five person majority of the Supreme Court) the
defendant's dangerousness. Id. at 363-365.
168. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
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treatment. On the other hand, it might invite the jury to find
him presently mentally ill and either dangerous or in need of
treatment because he committed a criminal act in the past.
Surely, a defendant should not have to defend himself
against both a criminal charge and involuntary commitment in
the same proceeding, especially when evidence about his pres-
ent and future mental condition has never been presented.
Indeed, it would be reversible error for the prosecutor to intro-
duce any evidence on issues of present mental illness, need for
treatment or dangerousness during the course of the criminal
trial. Yet the special verdict invites the jury to render specula-
tive findings of "fact" on such issues without the benefit of
probative evidence.
E. No Right to Immediate Treatment
S.H.B. 1179 takes a curious approach in providing for the
treatment of a criminal defendant found both guilty of one or
more crimes and also acquitted of another crime by reason of
criminal mental deficiency. Any period of inpatient treatment
must be served after the defendant first serves his prison
term.169 Thus, a citizen is being committed ostensibly because
he is mentally ill and needs treatment. Yet, he may not receive
the treatment he needs for a number of years.
This provision is highly suspect and would almost cer-
tainly be struck down as unconstitutional. In State v. Sommer-
ville 70 the Washington Supreme Court held that a defendant
found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity on one charge and
guilty on another must first be sent to a psychiatric facility
before he could be sent to a prison. Almost certainly, the court
would take the same approach with a defendant convicted of
one charge, but acquitted of another, because of criminal
mental deficiency.
In addition, committing acquitted defendants as mental
health patients would raise all of the questions currently posed
in the civil commitment system, such as the right to treat-
ment,' - ' the right to refuse psychotropic medication,'72 and
169. S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4, at Section 12(4)(b).
170. 111 Wash. 2d 524, 760 P.2d 932 (1988).
171. See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d
96, 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1984).
172. See Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 759 P.2d 358 (1988), cert. granted, 109
S.Ct. 1337 (1989).
[Vol. 13:1
1989] Diminished Capacity Defense Under Attack 35
state liability for negligent release.173 In short, even if it did
pass constitutional muster-and that is a dubious prospect-
creating a separate system of commitment for criminal defend-
ants acquitted by criminal mental deficiency opens a Pandora's
Box of collateral controversy that is simply not worth the can-
dle. If the state considers a diminished capacity defendant
acquitted of all charges (a rare probability) to be presently
mentally ill and dangerous, it should seek his civil commit-
ment under the state's Involuntary Treatment Act.'74
It is all too obvious that the commitment provision of
S.H.B. 1179 is intended to chill the assertion of diminished
capacity by employing the ultimate threat of confinement in a
psychiatric facility for anyone who is successful. A courageous
court would surely see through this transparent scheme and
reject it.
VIII. PERMISSIBLE BOUNDARIES OF REFORM
There are legislative reforms to the diminished capacity
defense in Washington that could be made without running a
significant risk of constitutional infirmity. They would
enhance the accuracy of fact-finding when diminished capacity
is raised, thereby alleviating the concern that the guilty are
going free or being punished too lightly.17 5
First, the legislature can probably require a criminal
defendant to give timely notice of his intention to raise dimin-
ished capacity in a criminal trial.'76 This would give the prose-
173. See Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
174. See supra note 3.
175. See supra notes 12 and 13.
176. State v. Hutchinson, 111 Wash. 2d 872, 766 P.2d 447 (1989). Section 4(1) of
S.H.B. 1179 provides:
Sec. 4. Section 3, Chapter 117, Laws of 1973 1st ex. sess. as amended by
section 3, chapter 198, Laws of 1974 ex. sess. and R.C.W. 10.77.030 are each
amended to read as follows:
(1) Evidence of criminal insanity or criminal mental deficiency is not
admissible unless the defendant, at the time of arraignment or within ten days
thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit, files a
written notice of (his) intent to rely on such a defense. In a case in which the
defense of either criminal insanity or criminal mental deficiency is raised,
the defendant shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney the following
information no later than thirty days prior to trial: (a) For any expert
witness, a written report substantially in the form described in RCW.
10.77.060; (b) the facts and data underlying the expert's testimony; and (c) the
names and addresses of persons who the defendant intends to call as
witnesses, together with any written or recorded statements and the substance
of any oral statements of such witnesses. Delay resulting from a defendant's
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cution sufficient time to compile evidence on this question,
including retaining mental health experts if necessary.
Second, a defendant who raises the diminished capacity
defense can be compelled to submit to a psychiatric examina-
tion by a government expert. In State v. Hutchinson7 7 the
Washington Supreme Court held that a defendant who raises
the diminished capacity defense may be ordered to submit to a
psychiatric or psychological exam by a state expert without
violating his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.' 78  The court based its conclusion on the right to recipro-
cal discovery.'79 If the legislature deemed it useful, it could
legislatively codify this result.
Legislation could also limit the form and content of expert
testimony. An expert could be prohibited from testifying as to
a defendant's "capacity" to entertain the requisite state of
mind. California has taken this approach.' In the alternative,
failure to disclose in a timely manner shall be excluded in computing the
time for arraignment and time for trial under the applicable court rule.
S.H.B. 1179, supra note 4, at Section 4(1). This may be an over-broad disclosure
requirement. See State v. Hutchinson, 111 Wash. 2d 872, 766 P.2d 447 (1989) (holding,
inter alia, that the prosecution cannot compel a defense mental health expert to com-
pile a report in connection with a forensic evaluation and trial testimony).
177. 111 Wash. 2d 872, 766 P.2d 447 (1989).
178. Id. at 880, 766 P.2d at 452.
179. The court cautioned, however, that the prosecution could not use statements
made by the accused to the government mental health expert to establish the
defendant's guilt. Section 3(4) of S.H.B. 1179 provides that:
No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination
provided for by this chapter and done without the consent of the defendant,
no testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and no other fruits of
the statement may be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any
criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition or which
the defendant has introduced testimony. Any statement made by a defendant
during an examination provided for by this chapter and fruits of such
statement may be used in any proceeding if voluntarily made with the
defendant's consent and otherwise admissible.
It is not clear, however, whether this last sentence opens the door to using a
defendant's voluntary statements to establish his culpability, which the previous sen-
tence had seemingly closed.
180. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28 (West 1988):
(a) Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder shall
not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state,
including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation,
deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the
act. Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is
admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a
required specific intent premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice
aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.
(b) As a matter of public policy there shall be no defense of diminished
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experts could be legislatively barred from testifying on "ulti-
mate issues," including culpability elements. Under this
approach, a mental health expert could not express an opinion
as to whether the defendant acted with "premeditation" or
"intent" or other state of mind required for conviction. This
would help prevent expert domination of the jury. Federal
Rule of Evidence 704 places this restriction on expert testi-
mony, in part, to ensure that expert opinion does not usurp the
jury's final responsibility for determining guilt or innocence."8 '
Either of these limitations should withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
Section 5 of S.H.B. 1179 takes essentially the same
approach as Federal Rule 704 which provides: "No expert wit-
ness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state
constituting an element of the crime charged. Such an ulti-
mate issue is a matter for the trier of fact alone." This should
withstand constitutional attack.
Trial courts should also ensure that diminished capacity is
kept within appropriate bounds of relevance. Judges should
not admit evidence of mental health experts who render opin-
ions on the defendant's unconscious mental processes or psy-
chological motivations. As the court stated in State v. Sikora:
Criminal responsibility must be judged at the level of the
conscious. If a person thinks, plans, and executes the plan at
that level, the criminality of his act cannot be denied, wholly
capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse in a criminal action
or juvenile adjudication hearing.
(c) This section shall not be applicable to an insanity hearing pursuant to
Section 1026 or 1429.5.
(d) Nothing in this section shall limit a court's discretion, pursuant to the
Evidence Code to exclude psychiatric or psychological evidence on whether
the accused had a mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder at the
time of the alleged offense.
California precluded mental health experts from testifying about "capacity" to form
criminal states of mind because they were skeptical that these specialists had the nec-
essary skill to determine such a difficult question. As stated by two commentators:
"The [California] lawmakers found that because mental-health science does not have
sufficient scientific foundation on the issue of the relationship of the capacity to form
mens rea to its actual formation, expert testimony on the capacity issue often is
unfounded speculation and cannot assist the factfinder." Morse and Cohen, Diminish-
ing Diminished Capacity in California, 2 CAL. LAw. 24 (June, 1982). Defendants are
still permitted to introduce expert testimony to prove they did not entertain the requi-
site state of mind.
181. FED. R. EVID. 704.
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or partially, because, although he did not realize it, his con-
scious was influenced to think, to plan and to execute the
plan by unconscious influences which were the product of
his genes and his lifelong environment. 8 2
The court in Pohlot agreed with this approach: "Mens rea
is generally satisfied, however, by any showing of purposeful
activity, regardless of its psychological origins."'81 3 Put simply,
too many psychiatric and psychological opinions in criminal tri-
als are based on unconscious determinism in which the expert
assumes that the real source of human action is the individ-
ual's unconscious, and not the conscious.' 4 This type of testi-
mony is simply not germane to the assessment of criminal
responsibility.
In addition, courts should also monitor expert testimony
carefully to ensure that the witness is not redefining statutory
terms of culpability. Testimony to the effect that mental ill-
ness prevented a criminal defendant from fully comprehending
the moral depravity of his action or controlling his behavior is
simply irrelevant to the culpability concepts of premeditation,
intent, knowledge, and recklessness under Washington law.8 5
Jury instructions should make that crystal clear.
Trial judges can and should keep the diminished capacity
defense within its logical and doctrinal bounds by excluding
testimony that is simply not probative of culpability and by
informing the jury in clear terms of the legal definitions of cul-
pability. This will be the most effective control to prevent
irrelevant and confusing testimony from being used to con-
found the criminal justice system's quest for fairness and
truth. And of course, appellate courts should support appropri-
ate limitations by trial judges.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is no sound evidence indicating that the diminished
capacity defense is asserted successfully with significant fre-
quency in Washington. Nonetheless, some prosecutors are dis-
satisfied with the current diminished capacity doctrine in
182. Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 16, at 46-47.
183. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 904 (3rd Cir. 1987).
184. See State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965).
185. In Washington, premeditation encompasses "the mental processes of thinking
beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time,
however short." State v. Brooks, 97 Wash. 2d 873, 651 P.2d 217 (1982). See supra notes
20-36 and accompanying text.
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Washington. During the past two legislative sessions, W.A.P.A.
has proposed significant legislative changes to this judge-made
criminal law doctrine.
If these changes are enacted into law by the legislature, it
will be only a matter of time before convictions obtained under
the new law are attacked on constitutional grounds. In our
view, there are simply too many targets of opportunity for suc-
cessful constitutional attack in the various bills proposed by
W.A.P.A. If enacted, several key provisions of S.H.B. 1179
would probably be declared unconstitutional and convictions
and commitments of dangerous offenders would be reversed or
terminated. This would create unnecessary chaos in the crimi-
nal justice system and may even result in the release of dan-
gerous offenders. There is simply no need to run this risk
because of excessive prosecutorial fervor.
A good argument can be made that the case for reform has
not been persuasively demonstrated. Nonetheless, if the legis-
lature agrees that reform in Washington's diminished capacity
doctrine is in order, it should take the less drastic measures
outlined in this article. To take the Draconian measures pro-
posed by W.A.P.A. will simply plant a time bomb which may
well explode in the years ahead, doing more harm than good
for community safety.
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